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on how to assess privatization, at least in countries 
where there is still scope for it. The paper suggests 
that although understanding of the efficiency gains of 
privatization has increased significantly in recent years, 
there is an important area about which little is known: 
the distributional effects of privatization. Whether 
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arguing from the standpoint of welfare economics or 
political economy, distributional effects are critical to 
the outcome, or the perceived outcome, of privatization. 
Thus, there is a need to fully evaluate the ex ante and ex 
post impacts of privatization, the most effective types of 
regulation and ownership regimes, and the way in which 
losers, when there are any, can be compensated. This is 
a need that must be met by academics and development 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The role of the private sector in development cannot be addressed fully without 
discussing privatization—the process whereby an activity is shifted from the state, mainly state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), to the private sector.
1 The conventional wisdom is that privatization 
should increase the efficiency of the economy because private firms are effective cost 
minimizers and profit maximizers, whereas SOEs often face soft budget constraints and engage 
in objectives other than cost minimization, such as implementing the state’s social welfare 
policies. 
The efficiency argument for privatization is voiced at times with exceeding forcefulness 
by some economists. Not a long time ago, a Nobel laureate in economics attending a conference 
on growth and development concluded his presentation on growth strategies with this simple 
recommendation: “In order to grow, in order to develop, you need to do three things: liberalize, 
stabilize, and privatize.” 
In this paper we briefly review what is known about privatization in developing countries 
(including transition economies) in order to draw some lessons for policy and to offer some 
suggestions on how to assess privatization, at least in countries where there is still scope for it. 
We will show that the prescription for achieving growth and development is not as simple as the 
recommendation of the Nobel laureate. 
It is true that our understanding of the efficiency gains of privatization has increased 
significantly in recent years, but there is an important area about which we know little: the 
distributional effects of privatization. Whether we are arguing from the standpoint of welfare 
economics or of political economy, distributional effects are critical to the outcome, or the 
perceived outcome, of privatization. Indeed, it is possible that much of the attitude of the public 
toward privatization might be linked to distributional effects that are not being well captured in 
our current analysis. 
                                                            
1  The state may be the central government or local governments. 2 
 
Figure 1 shows indexes of dissatisfaction with privatization in Latin America for the 
years 1998 and 2005 as reported by Latinobarómetro, an annual public opinion survey carried 
out in 18 countries in the region. The poll asked the public in several Latin American countries 
whether privatization had been beneficial for the country. As early as 1998, negative opinions 
about privatization averaged 40 percent, and seven years after privatization had peaked in the 
region, more than 60 percent of respondents in all reporting countries expressed negative views.
2  
If we believe that the efficiency argument is so strong, why are there such high levels of 
negative opinion about the benefits of privatization? That is the central question of this paper. 
In what follows, we first describe the trends in privatization in developing countries and 
the indicators used to measure the extent of privatization. Next, we briefly discuss the economic 
theory behind privatization. We do not attempt a comprehensive review; there are many good 
and exhaustive books on this topic, chief among them those by the distinguished late Jean-
Jacques Laffont and his colleague Jean Tirole. Rather, we simply illustrate a few basic points 
concerning the economics of privatization. We then present empirical evidence on the main 
effects of privatization and, finally, draw conclusions. 
II.  Trends in Privatization in Developing Countries 
Since the 1984 privatization of British Telecom, developed and developing countries 
have adopted privatization programs to different extents. To date, almost every developing 
country has divested some SOEs to the private sector; cumulative proceeds raised by 
privatizations during the period 1988–2005 approach US$530 billion in constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars. 
Considering first the two most widely used indicators, proceeds and number of deals, we 
see that privatization started slowly in the 1980s, with fewer than 89 transactions per year and 
proceeds of less than US$4.0 billion. Two decades after the privatization of British Telecom, 
however, proceeds approached US$56 billion per year, and the number of transactions had 
increased to about 200 per year. During those two decades, developing countries witnessed 
various waves of privatization.  
                                                            
2  These years were chosen simply because 1998 was the peak year of the second and last big wave of privatization 
in Latin America and 2005 is the most recent year for which information on attitudes toward privatization is 
available in Latinobarómetro. 3 
 
From the standpoint of proceeds from privatization, three waves can be identified: from 
1990 to 1994, from 1996 to 2002, and starting in 2003 (Figure 2, top panel). But when the focus 
is on the number of deals (transactions), the situation is different. There was only one big wave, 
in the mid-1990s, and it was driven mostly by the privatization process in Europe and Central 
Asia (Figure 2, bottom panel). A comparison of the proceeds from privatization and the numbers 
of deals shows that the average size of privatization operations has increased substantially over 
the years. In 1995 the average size of a privatization was rather small, at US$40 million, but by 
2005 the average was US$290 million. Proceeds from privatization and the number of deals are 
neither sufficient nor informative enough as indicators of the extent of privatization. For a better 
and more complete picture, indicators that relate privatization to the size of the economy, as 
measured by gross domestic product (GDP), aggregate capital stock, or the importance of public 
enterprises in the economy, would be more valuable.  
Figure 3 shows the proceeds from privatization as a share of GDP in three world regions. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean two waves of comparable importance are evident, in the 
early 1990s and in the late 1990s. Among the countries responsible for those big waves are 
Mexico, where the proceeds from privatization represented 3.6 percent of GDP in 1991, and 
Brazil, with 4.1 percent of GDP in 1998. Thus, the privatization process in Latin America and 
the Caribbean during the 1990s was rather sizable. The Europe and Central Asia region exhibits 
more peaks and troughs than other regions in proceeds as a share of GDP, and until recently, the 
size of the proceeds was below Latin American levels. But the 2000s have witnessed a radical 
change in the latter indicator, with accumulated proceeds during the period 1988–2005 
approaching US$150 billion in constant 2000 US dollars, against US$223 billion for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Finally, in East Asia and the Pacific proceeds from privatization 
have been generally low as a share of GDP. 
In assessing the potential role of privatization, what matters most is the relative sizes of 
the private and public sectors and the structural change attributable to privatization. Accordingly, 
it is useful to analyze not only the annual flows of privatization proceeds but also the cumulative 
flows, as illustrated by Figure 4. The accumulated proceeds from privatization in Europe and 
Central Asia for the period 1988 to 2005 came to about 16 percent of 2000 GDP, equivalent to 
around 5 percent of productive assets in those countries (assuming a capital-output ratio of about 4 
 
3). In Latin America and the Caribbean the accumulated proceeds amounted to about 11 percent 
of 2000 GDP, or close to 4 percent of productive assets. Keeping in mind that privately operated 
assets are more productive than publicly operated assets, the contribution of the privatization 
process to GDP growth, in static terms, has been substantial. For instance, on the assumption that 
the productivity of assets is twice as high when they are privately operated than when they are 
publicly managed, privatization in Latin America and the Caribbean contributed about a quarter 
of a percentage point annually to growth, which is not negligible. In East Asia, South Asia, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa the intensity of privatization has been much less and may have contributed, 
at most, 0.1 percent of growth during this period. 
The dominant sectors for privatization during the period 1988-2005 were infrastructure, 
finance, and energy. This is important because later we argue that these sectors are probably less 
competitive than the manufacturing sectors, with important implications for the impact of 
privatization. 
Although we do not have reliable information on the size of the public sector at each 
point of time, we do have some data gathered by the World Bank in the mid-1990s on the share 
of SOE activity in GDP and the share of SOEs’ investment in gross domestic investment (GDI). 
These data, combined with the figures on accumulated proceeds as a share of GDP, provide a 
more complete picture of the extent of privatization in a sample of countries over the last 15 
years. In Argentina, for instance, SOE activity was about 3 percent of GDP in 1990, as shown in 
Figure 5, and the accumulated proceeds from privatization for the period 1988–2005 were about 
14 percent of 2000 GDP. Using a capital-output ratio of roughly 3, one can conjecture that in a 
country such as Argentina, privatization of the economy has basically been completed. In India, 
by contrast, the assets that have been privatized are small in comparison with the share of SOEs 
in GDP in 1993, and so the scope for privatization there is still rather large. The same can be said 
of China and many African countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire.
3 So, privatization is not an issue that 
belongs to the past and it is all the more important to understand how best to privatize in 
countries where there is still scope for it. 
                                                            
3  Although we lack information on the share of SOEs in GDP in China, it does not seem unreasonable to assume 
that it should be about half their share in GDI. Then SOEs would still be responsible for 10 percent of GDP in 1997; 
privatization might have reduced that share by roughly 2 percent since then. 5 
 
III.  The Simple Economics of Privatization 
We begin this section with a brief review of the main theories of state versus private 
ownership. Next, a simple example is presented to illustrate the trade-offs that policy makers 
face when considering privatization, in particular with respect to distributional issues. The main 
conclusion of this discussion is that theory alone is unlikely to yield a definitive answer about the 
merits (or shortcomings) of privatization. The type of private ownership to emerge after 
privatization, the characteristics of the product market (competitive or noncompetitive), the 
method of privatization, and other considerations will determine the overall outcome of 
privatization. 
There is a huge theoretical literature on public versus private ownership and 
management. For the most part, the debate concerning the role of SOEs has been framed 
according to three views. The social view sees SOEs as institutions created by a social welfare–
maximizing government to resolve actual or perceived market failures; whereas private firms 
maximize profits, SOEs maximize broader social objectives (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). The 
agency view also assumes that governments seek to maximize social welfare but focuses on the 
discrepancy between the objectives of managers (the agents) and of owners (the principals) 
within the two ownership regimes. SOE managers, confronted with weak incentives compared 
with those facing private firms, will channel resources to socially profitable activities but will 
expend less effort (or divert more resources) than their private counterparts.
4 This view 
concludes that, given the differences in incentives associated with public or private ownership, 
overall social welfare should depend on the trade-off between internal economic efficiency 
(under private ownership) and allocative efficiency (under public ownership); see Alchian 
(1965); Vickers and Yarrow (1988, 1991); Shapiro and Willig (1990); Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
Finally, the political-economy view suggests that SOEs represent a mechanism for pursuing the 
individual goals of politicians, such as maximizing employment or financing favored enterprises. 
Accordingly, SOEs are inefficient because of the deliberate policy of transferring resources to 
their supporters (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Shleifer 1998). 
                                                            
4  In private firms the discrepancy among objectives is reduced by the threat of takeover and bankruptcy, a 
managerial labor market, and the existence of ownership rights that allow the principals to sell the firm if they are 
not satisfied with managerial performance. 6 
 
A textbook example will help illustrate these issues, as well as others that are intrinsic to 
the privatization process. Consider the case of a municipality that intends to privatize the 
provision of clean water. The market for water provision has the characteristics described next. 
The quantity, q, of water demanded depends on the price, p, at which it is sold, according 
to the following demand schedule: 
q=100 -0.1p      (1) 
The cost, C, of distributing water comprises a fixed cost equal to 1,000 monetary units ($) 
and the cost of labor. Employment (E) to distribute q units of water is given by: 
E = q/λ     (2) 
where λ is a productivity parameter. Under these conditions, the total cost of water is: 
C = 1,000 + wq/ λ (3) 
where w is the unit cost of labor; w is initially set at $10 and λ at 0.1. 
In response to the large fixed cost, significant economies of scale, inelastic demand, and 
externalities (not taken into account here) involved in the provision of water, it is assumed that 
water is provided by a SOE that is subsidized by the government. As the first column of Table 1 
shows, the subsidy allows the SOE to sell water at a price of $80 (below its marginal cost of 
$100), but only 85 units of water are provided. The low price and the relatively small quantity 
imply that some consumers are rationed; at the price of $80, consumers would like to consume 
92 units instead of the 85 units offered by the SOE. In this simple example, it is assumed that 
because of lack of monitoring incentives at the managerial level, workers in the SOE produce 
only 80 percent of what they would produce otherwise. To produce 85 units of water, the SOE 
thus employs 1,062.5 labor units instead of 850. At a wage rate of $10, the total wage bill is 
$10,625. The total amount of government subsidy to the SOE is $4,825 (including fixed costs), 
and that figure is equal to the SOE loss. The cost for consumers, at least for those who have 
access to water, is $6,800. 
  The consumer surplus is a measure of the overall welfare of consumers. It is equal to the 
price they would be willing to pay for each successive unit of water they consume, up to their 7 
 
actual consumption, 85 units, minus the actual amount they pay, or $6,800. In this particular 
case, it is equal to $42,075.5
5 
Assume now that the government decides to privatize water provision. There are many 
ways to privatize; consider as a starting point a private monopoly that is regulated so that the 
private company has a cap on the price that it can charge. Assume that the price is set at $120, 
with the company having the contractual obligation to provide universal service and to distribute 
all the water that is demanded at the set price. Finally, it is assumed that the private monopoly 
receives no subsidy for its operation (that is, it has a hard budget constraint). What are the 
implications of this type of privatization? 
The first consequence, as shown in the second column of Table 1, is that the quantity of 
water supplied increases from 85 to 88 units. Second, at the higher price, the quantity demanded 
decreases, and there is no rationing, in accordance with the terms of the contract under which the 
monopoly is regulated. Third, managerial incentives are such that workers devote more effort, 
and they work now at full productivity. Consequently, employment decreases from 1,062.5 labor 
units to 880 units, even though output is now larger.
6 Fourth, the government subsidy is zero. 
Fifth, total expenditures by consumers increase from $6,800 to $10,560. As a consequence, 
consumer welfare falls to $38,720. 
If we compare the two situations, a subsidized SOE and a regulated private monopoly, we 
find, in the first place, an efficiency gain; the monopoly produces more output with fewer 
workers (Table 2). The explanation is that the private monopoly is monitoring labor in a more 
efficient way. There are changes in the distribution of welfare; this outcome is crucial from our 
viewpoint, as is discussed below, but it has received little attention in the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Consider the distribution of costs and benefits among agents in this example. 
First, the taxpayer gains from the privatization process. The government had been 
subsidizing the SOE in the amount of $4,825, and now there are no more subsidies. The taxpayer 
thus gains back the $4,825. (Alternatively, the government can allocate that money to other 
objectives thought to be valuable to taxpayers.) Second, consumers lose because the price has 
                                                            
5  This corresponds to the area below the demand curve at the rationed quantity 85. 
6   We assume that the wage rate is the same, but it might also be allowed to vary. 8 
 
increased. But the story actually is slightly more complicated; consumers are worse off because 
of the price increase, but access to water has increased. The disappearance of rationing should 
contribute positively to consumer welfare, but it is difficult to measure that effect without getting 
into the details of the rationing scheme. This, again, is an important distributional issue.
7 Third, 
employees are worse off, in two ways: fewer workers are employed, and workers have to expend 
more effort working for the private monopoly than when they were working for the subsidized 
SOE. (This effect is not taken into account in Table 2.) Fourth, business owners, who were not 
making money in the SOE, are now making a profit of $760. The total gain for the economy 
from this privatization is thus $405. The important point is that the privatization generates both 
losers and winners.  
To go further we would need to understand better who are the “agents” listed in Table 2. 
Who are the taxpayers? Are they the same individuals as the consumers? Who are the 
employees? Are they taxpayers? Are they consumers? Who are the business owners? Are the 
business owners the taxpayers? And within each group, we would like to know whether the 
individuals affected by the privatization are poor, members of the middle class, or rich. Who will 
be protesting in the streets tomorrow against privatization, and who will lobby the government 
for the privatization to go on? That depends on the answer to all these questions. This is the sort 
of analysis that is needed in order to evaluate the social welfare impact of privatization while 
taking its distributional effects fully into account. 
In the preceding example, privatization entails a private monopoly with universal service, 
a price cap, and no subsidy. But privatization can also involve a monopoly that charges a price 
equal to the marginal cost and receives a subsidy for the amount of the fixed cost. Then the profit 
of the operator would be zero, and the distributional effects would be completely different. We 
can also think about unbundling the SOE, with an agent managing the fixed-cost part of the 
operation and competitive firms sharing the variable cost of the industry. Again, this will lead to 
different distributional implications. 
Thus, theory alone is unlikely to be conclusive about the trade-offs between government 
and private ownership. All the dimensions discussed above are important, and they should be 
                                                            
7  The assumption that all consumers are rationed in the same proportion would make the correction for rationing 
unnecessary. 9 
 
taken into account when thinking about privatization. Realistically, what do we know about these 
factors? In view of the simple example above, there clearly are at least two criteria that should be 
considered when evaluating privatization: productive efficiency and distributional impact. In the 
next section, we review some empirical evidence along both dimensions. 
IV.  Empirical Evidence    
It is surprising that when most of the privatization programs started in the mid-1980s, 
there were few empirical studies on the impact of privatization on firm performance and welfare 
distribution, and the existing studies were far from conclusive. Since then, the number of 
empirical studies has increased and includes privatization programs in different settings—
competitive and noncompetitive markets, developed and developing countries, and so on. Yet, as 
will be seen below, many of these studies still have conceptual and methodological 
shortcomings.   
Conceptual and Methodological Issues 
Beyond the usual data and sample size difficulties, assessment of the impact of 
privatization is plagued with conceptual and methodological issues. First, to assess the impact of 
a policy change such as privatization, we need a counterfactual; that is, we need to imagine what 
would have happened in the absence of privatization. This is inevitably problematic. The 
problems are more pervasive in the case of utilities, where privatization can generate a host of 
general equilibrium effects, including relative price changes in output markets (tariff 
rebalancing) and input markets, as well as spillovers to other sectors of the economy.
8 Second, 
causality is an important issue in assessing the impact of privatization. For example, performance 
may change because of other events or circumstances contemporaneous with privatization, such 
as shifts in the macroeconomic environment, regulatory changes, or promotion of competition. 
This issue is of particular relevance in the assessment of privatization in transition economies. 
Third, the potential selection bias in the SOEs to be privatized—the endogeneity problem—is 
                                                            
8  World Bank (2005) reviews the growth impact of the main policy and institutional reforms introduced in the 
1990s  including privatization and deregulation.  10 
 
important. If the allocation of firms for privatization is nonrandom, studies that do not adequately 
control for endogeneity will be biased.
9 
   This section reviews the empirical evidence concerning the impact of privatization on 
efficiency and welfare distribution and illustrates some of the issues mentioned above with 
examples drawn from existing empirical studies. 
Firm Performance 
In the last few years, three excellent surveys reviewing the empirical evidence of 
privatization on firm performance have been published: Megginson and Netter (2001), Djankov 
and Murrell (2002), and Estrin et al. (2007). From our perspective, the strength of these surveys 
in comparison with similar papers is that they review the evidence while giving unique 
consideration to the methodological problems discussed above.
10 
Megginson and Netter review 38 studies that examine the impact of privatization on the 
operating efficiency, ownership structure, or financial performance of former SOEs in developed 
and developing countries (including transition economies), as well as in competitive and 
noncompetitive markets, mostly utilities. They find that almost all studies of nontransition 
economies that examine postprivatization changes in output, efficiency, capital investment 
spending, and profitability document significant increases in these variables and significant 
decreases in leverage. The studies, however, are less unanimous with respect to the impact of 
privatization on employment. Some studies find significant increases; others, significant 
decreases; and still others, insignificant changes in employment following privatization.
 11 
A first example to illustrate the empirical evidence concerning the impact of privatization 
on efficiency is drawn from the wave of privatization of nonfinancial firms in Mexico during the 
period 1983–91 (La Porta and López-de-Silanes 1999). The authors include in their sample both 
                                                            
9 Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2000) present evidence of nonrandomness in privatization in the Czech Republic. 
10  Other useful surveys are Kikeri and Nellis (2004) and Shirley and Walsh (2000).  
11 According to Megginson and Netter (2001), the most compelling studies, taking into account sample size, 
coverage, and methodological rigor, are for nontransition economies: Galal et al. (1994); La Porta and López-de-
Silanes (1999); Dewenter and Malatesta (2001); and the three articles summarized in D’Souza and Megginson 
(1999). For transition economies the best studies (using the above criteria) are Dyck (1997); Weiss and Nikitin 
(1998); Claessens and Djankov (1999); Lizal, Singer, and Svejnar (2001); and Frydman et al. (1999). 11 
 
SOEs and a control group of privately owned firms spanning a wide variety of industries and 
firm sizes, to control for potential biases. 
Figure 6 presents four indicators of firm performance: sales per employee, employment, 
sales, and prices. These indicators are documented for the industry overall and for the 
competitive and noncompetitive parts of the industry.
12 For all industries, as well as for the 
competitive and noncompetitive subsectors, privatization has a significant efficiency effect in 
this sample of Mexican firms. Sales and productivity increase, whereas employment drops. On a 
different register, prices increase slightly. In agreement with theory, there is almost no price 
effect for privatized firms in competitive subsectors, but there is a large price effect for 
privatized firms in noncompetitive sectors. This example illustrates clearly the difference that a 
competitive environment makes for the effects of privatization. 
In their review of the empirical evidence for transition economies, Megginson and Netter 
distinguish between Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU). In Central 
and Eastern Europe the evidence suggests that private ownership is associated with better firm-
level performance and that foreign ownership, where allowed, is associated with greater 
performance improvement than purely domestic ownership. Majority ownership by outsider 
(nonemployee) investors is associated with significantly greater improvement than any form of 
insider control. The key advantage of outside control is the restructuring that takes place at the 
firm level. The impact of privatization on employment is ambiguous, mainly because 
employment decreased for almost all firms in transition economies after wide-ranging reforms 
were initiated. 
The authors note that assessing the impact of privatization in the FSU is much more 
difficult because these republics were under communist control the longest and the transition 
from a planned economy coincided with the disorders created by the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. In addition, at the time of the survey the contraction of output that occurred after 1991 
was far greater than anywhere in Eastern Europe, with no upturn in sight. Thus, according to the 
authors, there is no empirical study of the impact of privatization on performance that is truly 
                                                            
12 The definitions of competitive or noncompetitive industries are based on the description of the industry provided 
in the privatization prospectus. 12 
 
persuasive from a methodological point of view. That being said, an important result of all the 
studies is that insider privatization has not been a success in the FSU. 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) review the empirical evidence on the effects of privatization 
on firm performance (productivity, sales, profits, etc.) and on qualitative indicators (wage 
arrears, creation of new products, and so on) in transition economies.
13 In contrast to Megginson 
and Netter (2001), they use formal meta-analysis to synthesize the evidence of more than 100 
empirical studies instead of relying on a verbal description or an interpretative summary of the 
studies. From our perspective, one of the most interesting characteristics of this survey is that the 
methodology can explicitly address the issue of differences in the quality of studies, thereby 
showing to what extent the conclusions change if greater weight is given to studies that appear 
methodologically sound. Even so, the meta-analysis echoes in some respect the initial results 
presented by Megginson and Netter. Djankov and Murrell find that privatization is strongly 
associated with better performance and with improvements in qualitative indicators of 
production restructuring. These findings, however, are not statistically significant for firm 
performance in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The results are 
robust to the use of weights that reflect different attention to selection bias or to the quality of the 
analysis. 
One reason that privatization may have varying effects across regions is that the 
privatization process has led to different mixes of owners. Djankov and Murrell find that state 
ownership within traditional state firms has less effect on firm performance than any other 
ownership regime except worker ownership, which has a negative effect on performance.
14 
Privatization to diffuse individual owners has no effect on performance, and privatization to 
investment funds or foreigners has a large positive effect. Privatization to investment funds is 
                                                            
13  Djankov and Murrell (2002) use the term “restructuring measure” to capture both quantitative (performance) and 
qualitative indicators. Employment is not used as an indicator in their study because of the substantial disagreement 
in the literature on the impact of privatization on employment. 
14 Djankov and Murrell (2002) use 11 categories of ownership, some of which overlap: (a) traditional state 
ownership (enterprises that are 100 percent state owned and have not been part of a privatization program); (b) state 
ownership in enterprises that are treated as private under the corporate governance laws and, usually, have been part 
of a privatization program; (c) insiders (a composite group that includes both workers and managers); (d) outsiders 
(a composite group consisting of all nonemployee, nonstate owners); (e) workers; (f) managers; (g) foreign owners 
of all types; (h) banks, except those included in (g); (i) investment funds, unless ownership of the fund is such that 
(b), (g), or (h) applies; (j) blockholders, that is, outsider ownership concentrated in the hands of large individual 
owners, unless the blockholder could be classified under (b) or (f)–(i); and (k) diffuse outsider—the residual outsider 
ownership category, when outsider owners are not identified as belonging to categories (g)–(j). 13 
 
five times as productive as that to insiders, and privatization to foreigners or blockholders is 
three times as productive as privatization to insiders. The effect of different ownership regimes 
varies among regions. 
A second example based on the privatization experience of Central and Eastern Europe 
illustrates the efficiency impact of privatization. Frydman et al. (1999) draw on firm data from 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland for the period 1990–93 and seek to disentangle the 
efficiency effect of privatization according to type of ownership. Their study is also interesting 
because it includes a control group (a counterfactual) consisting of firms that were SOEs at the 
beginning of the period and remained SOEs at the end of the period. The only shortcoming of 
this work is that no correction has been made for the selectivity of the privatization process. 
Privatized firms in the sampled countries were not selected randomly. In the countries covered 
by Frydman et al., privatization improved efficiency when the firms were acquired by outsiders 
(Figure 7). Revenue increased, and employment did not change, leading to sizable productivity 
gains. Interestingly, when privatization entailed the transfer of ownership to firm insiders (either 
the managers or employees working in the SOE before privatization), the impact on efficiency 
was radically different. Revenue decreased in comparison with the control group, employment 
increased, leading to a drop in productivity. A possible explanation is that managers and workers 
of a privatized SOE try to extract more rent from the firm when they are in command. 
Finally, the survey by Estrin et al. (2007) addresses more rigorously the issue of selection 
bias or endogeneity that arises when better firms may have been privatized first in transition 
economies. The authors present some new results, as they can draw on recent studies in 
transition economies that employ better methodology, as well as studies for China that were 
barely reviewed in the two surveys cited above. Broadly, Estrin et al. find that privatization to 
foreign owners increases efficiency in relation to SOEs, although this result is less clear for 
China. Domestic private ownership has a positive effect on efficiency in Central and Eastern 
Europe, but the effect is smaller than that of foreign ownership. Russia seems to be different in 
that domestic private ownership and mixed ownership have a negative or insignificant effect on 
efficiency. Worker ownership in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, and collective 
ownership in China, do not seem to have a negative effect relative to other forms of private 
ownership, unlike the findings in the Djankov and Murrell study. Finally, data from Central and 14 
 
Eastern Europe and the CIS suggest that new firms appear to be as productive as or more 
productive than firms privatized to domestic owners and that foreign start-ups appear to be more 
efficient than domestic start-ups. Studies of employment find that privatizations in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the CIS, and China are not associated with reductions in employment. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the empirical evidence accumulated regarding 
firm performance is mainly based on data from member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Latin American countries, and economies in 
transition. The empirical evidence on the effects of privatization in Africa is not as deep and 
robust as the evidence discussed above. Thus, caution is necessary in generalizing the results 
presented above to low-income countries or small states. 
Distributional Impact 
In contrast to the huge number of studies on the impact of privatization on firm 
performance, relatively few studies analyze the impact on social welfare and its distribution. 
Moreover, these studies mostly cover OECD and Latin American countries; they focus mainly 
on the impact of privatization on consumer welfare in the utility sector; and they are less 
successful in controlling for potential biases. Birdsall and Nellis (2003) review some of this 
literature. As it is outlined here, our knowledge falls short of what is desirable for adequately 
assessing the impact of privatization on social welfare. 
Galal et al (1994) is the most persuasive of the studies. Its main strength is the 
construction of a clear counterfactual that allows for the measurement of the financial as well as 
the welfare impacts of privatization. The authors analyze 12 privatized companies (mostly 
airlines and regulated utilities) in Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and the United Kingdom to 
determine whether the transfer to private ownership increased efficiency and, if so, how the costs 
and benefits of the adjustment were allocated to government, foreign and domestic buyers, 
competitors, consumers, and employees. Galal et al. document welfare gains in 11 of the 12 
cases analyzed. In no case were workers worse off after privatization, and in three instances they 
were better off. Although this study is rigorous, it examines only a small number of firms in four 
countries and does not cover the wider range of aspects described earlier in this paper. 15 
 
Another study that attempts to shed some light on the implications of privatization for 
welfare is Ugaz and Waddams Price (2003). In contrast to Galal et al. (1994), this study focuses 
only on consumer welfare, using household surveys before and after privatization. The seven 
cases analyzed correspond to utilities in Latin America, Spain, and the United Kingdom and 
present a mixed picture. They show that prices have often risen as a result of the rebalancing of 
tariffs after privatization, and this has affected low-income groups more than others. But the 
study also shows that most companies have extended their coverage (access) so that the poor in 
developing countries, who initially enjoyed the least coverage, are benefiting the most from this 
aspect of privatization. 
Similar research was carried out for Latin America by the Inter-American Development 
Bank. The case study presented here is about the privatization of water distribution in two 
provinces of Bolivia, La Paz–El Alto, and Cochabamba (Barja, McKenzie, and Urquiola 2005). 
As was seen above, when discussing the simple economics of privatization, the two main 
determinants of the impact of privatization on consumer welfare are price and access. In the case 
of Bolivia, the 1997 privatization of water distribution in La Paz and El Alto produced only a 
slight increase in prices (Figure 8), but in Cochabamba, where privatization took place in 1999, 
prices increased enormously months later. 
To evaluate the welfare impact of privatization on consumers, access needs to be taken 
into account. Figure 9 shows the impact of privatization on households in La Paz and El Alto 
according to their initial access to water. The welfare of those households that enjoyed access 
before privatization did not change much, as prices did not increase substantially.  For 
households that gained access, there was a large positive impact on welfare. If it can be proved 
that this improved access was caused by privatization, privatization might have had a huge 
impact on consumer welfare. 
In Cochabamba privatization was very short-lived. The privatization took place in 
October 1999. In March 2000 widespread protests occurred—the so-called Water War—and the 
government decided to give the water operation back to the original SOE. Barja, McKenzie, and 
Urquiola (2005) estimated the impact of the price increase on income groups in the population, 
looking simply at the share of water expenditure in household budgets and calculating how much 
households would have to pay in addition. Figure 10 shows that the impact of privatization in 16 
 
Cochabamba was highly regressive, with all deciles losing welfare because of this price effect 
but with the poorest decile losing much more than the richest decile. 
The last example in this discussion is from a well-known study by Galiani, Gertler, and 
Schargrodsky (2005), who exploited variation in ownership across time and space to identify the 
causal effect of privatization of water distribution on child mortality in Argentina (Figure 11). 
From 1993 onward, several municipalities privatized the distribution of water, whereas other 
municipalities kept their initial arrangement with public companies, either national or local, thus 
providing a control group, or counterfactual. 
The evidence suggests that after 1993 child mortality rates in municipalities with 
privatized water distribution dropped faster than in those with nonprivatized water distribution. 
This is an interesting result. If we believe that changes in child mortality are mostly attributable 
to changes in the subgroups of the population in which child mortality is highest—often, the 
poorest people—this would mean that the privatization of water in Argentina had a progressive 
effect. But the difficulty with the approach taken in the paper is that it is a highly reduced form. 
We do not know through what channels the reduction in the child mortality rate took place. Did 
it occur because there was better access under privatized water companies? Or was it because the 
quality of water was better? We do not know. But this certainly is the type of evidence that is 
needed in order to understand the distributional impact of privatization. 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
The paucity of full evaluations of privatization operations in developing countries is 
surprising. There are some analyses of the efficiency gains of privatization, but there is very little 
assessment of the distributional impact of privatization, and most of the studies that do exist only 
consider the effect of price changes on consumers. Evaluations of the indirect effects of 
privatization—for example, the study of child mortality discussed earlier—are much rarer. The 
complete picture that was described in the analytical section of this paper is simply not available 
in the empirical analyses. Thus, one important conclusion of this brief review of privatization 
and development is the need to pursue this type of empirical analysis more exhaustively. If there 
is scope for privatization in some countries, we need to have more in-depth evaluations to guide 
our policies. 17 
 
The efficiency gains of privatization seem warranted in many cases. Moreover, gains in 
productivity and output do not always imply a loss in employment. There is little doubt that 
when we consider privatization in a competitive environment, the change is almost certainly 
positive. The distributional effects, however, are uncertain and opaque. The negative attitude 
toward privatization in Latin America that was described at the beginning of this paper may well 
be the result of that opacity. People are preoccupied with the impact on consumers and do not 
look at taxpayers at all, or they ignore the issue of access, or they simply follow the general 
negative political discourse against privatization or are concerned with the macroeconomic 
impact of privatization. This lack of knowledge is not a desirable state of affairs. 
Much more remains to be done at this stage toward evaluating the ex ante and ex post 
impacts of privatization, the most effective types of regulation and ownership regimes, and the 
way in which losers—when there are any—can be compensated. We have to rely on serious 
evaluations of different designs for those privatization operations. This is a need that must be met 
by the community of academics and development agencies, including the World Bank and 
regional development banks. We should try to exploit all the occasions when those institutions 
are involved in privatizations to extract the maximum information on the distributional impacts 
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Source: World Bank Privatization Database, http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/. 
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FIGURE 3 




Source: World Bank Privatization Database; World Development Indicators. Note: GDP, gross domestic product. 
 
FIGURE 4 
Accumulated Proceeds as Share of 2000 GDP, by Region and Sector, 1988–2005
 
Source: World Bank Privatization Database; World Development Indicators. Note: GDP, gross domestic product. 24 
 
FIGURE 5 





















FIGURE 6  
Change in Median Efficiency Performance in Competitive and Noncompetitive Industries before and after 

















Impact of Ownership on Performance, with State-Owned Enterprises as Reference, Fixed-Effects 
Coefficients, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, 1990–93
 
 
Source: Frydman et al. 1999. 
Note: The fixed-effects coefficients are estimated controlling for year and country. The coefficients for privatizations owned by 















Real Water Prices in Two Provinces of Bolivia, 1992–2000
Source: Barja, McKenzie, and Urquiola 2005. 
 
FIGURE 9 
Change in Welfare after 1997 Water Privatization, by Income Group, La Paz and El Alto Province, Bolivia
 











































TABLE 1  From a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) to a Regulated 
Private Monopoly: A Stylized Example of Privatization 
($, except as specified) 
Indicator  Subsidized SOE  Private monopoly  
(no subsidy; price cap) 
Price 80  120 
Subsidy, including fixed costs  4,825  0 
Quantity supplied (units)  85  88 
Quantity demanded (units)  92  88 
Employment (labor units)  1,062.5  880 
Sales 6,800  10,560 
Wage bill  10,625  8,800 
Profit (+) or loss (-)  -3,825  1,760 
Total profit or loss, including fixed  -4,825 760 
Implicit demand price  150  120 
Consumer surplus  42,075  38,720 
Source: Authors’ calculations.    
 
 
TABLE 2. Efficiency and Distributional Impact of Privatization.  
With State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) as a Reference 
($, except as specified) 
 
Impact Change 
Efficiency Gains   
Production (units)        3 
Employment (labor units)   - 182.5 
  
Distributional effects 





Business Owners      760 
   
Total Distributional effects      405 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a. The valuation of access depends on the rationing scheme.  
 